Abstract. This paper suggests a potential rationale for the recent empirical finding that overconfident agents tend to self-select into more competitive environments (e.g. Dohmen and Falk, forthcoming). In particular, it shows that moderate overconfidence in a contest can improve the agent's performance relative to an unbiased opponent and can even lead to an advantage for the overconfident agent in absolute terms.
Introduction
Recent empirical evidence shows that overconfident agents tend to self-select into more competitive environments than unbiased agents (e.g. Dohmen and Falk, forthcoming; Bartling et al., 2009) . At first sight, this may seem puzzling as overconfidence in contests is commonly found to reduce individual welfare due to suboptimally high effort choices, which -if at all -are beneficial for the principal (cf. Santos-Pinto, 2010; Ando, 2004) .
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However, an effect that seems to have gone unnoticed in the literature on overconfidence in contests is that the high effort of the overconfident agent may also lead to a comparative payoff-advantage of the biased agent due to an increased probability of success. In fact, although both Ando (2004) and Santos-Pinto (2010) touch on individual welfare effects of overconfidence in contests, neither of them considers relative payoff effects in their analysis (and we are not aware of any other paper that does so). Yet, as shown below, the induced increase in the probability of success of an overconfident agent may not only reverse the relative performance of the agents. It may even overcompensate the biased agent for his additional effort and, thereby, increase his payoff above the rational benchmark (if the bias is sufficiently small). Thus, overconfident agents may actually be correct in believing that they have a comparative advantage in more competitive environments such as economic contests.
In the sequel, we demonstrate these positive effects of overconfidence in a simple model of imperfectly discriminating contests in the tradition of Tullock (1980) .
Model and Results
The Model. Consider a standard two agent Tullock contest with linear effort costs where agents compete for a winner-price w H (the loser gets w L , with ∆w = w H − w L ).
2 In order to simplify the exposition, we restrict attention to a contest success function with a discriminatory power of 1. While not affecting the general thrust of the argument, the assumption, for example, guarantees the existence of equilibrium. Moreover, assume that one agent (agent 1) is overconfident while the other (agent 2) is rational. In particular, to capture agent 1's overly optimistic view on his abilities, assume that he has a biased perception of his effort cost, i.e.c 1 = c 1 − b where c 1 is agent 1's true cost of effort and 0 < b < c 1 . The rational agent 2, by contrast, has a correct view about his effort cost, i.e.c 2 = c 2 > 0. The resulting maximisation problem of agent i, then, is given by:
which gives rise to concave reaction functions with positive (negative) first derivatives for small (large) values of e −i . For the case of e 1 = e 2 = 0, assume that each agent wins the contest with probability 0.5. Again, the assumption is not restrictive as in equilibrium both agents will exert strictly positive effort. Finally, assume that both agents are informed about their own perceived effort costc i (but not about a potential own bias) and the perceived effort cost of their opponentc −i ; for the rational agent this is equivalent to assuming that he knows his true effort cost asc 1 = c 1 . In effect, the assumption ensures that both agents best respond to their opponent's action so that attention is restricted entirely to the effects of overconfidence while informational issues are set aside. 3 A standard argument, then, shows that the corresponding Nash equilibrium effort levels are:
and
Thus, if both agents are rational, i.e. b = 0, equilibrium effort levels are:
which we will consider as the benchmark for our analysis.
Aggregate Effects. To begin with, note that irrespective of agent 2's effort cost, agent 1's effort increases in his bias because
. The effort of the rational agent 2, by contrast, decreases in agent 1's overconfidence if agent 1's perceived effort cost is smaller than agent 2's true cost, i.e. ifc 1 < c 2 it holds that
; it increases otherwise. Similar to previous results (e.g. Santos-Pinto, 2010), combining these two effects yields that overconfidence is beneficial for the principal (who wants to maximise aggregate efforts) as the sum of the efforts in the case with overconfidence (equations (2) and (3)) is greater than the sum of the efforts in the rational benchmark (equations (4)):
Individual Effects. In order to assess the relative individual payoff effects, consider the agents' expected equilibrium payoffs. These are given by:
where the true effort cost has to be taken into account. Accordingly, the payoff difference between the overconfident agent 1 and the rational agent 2 is:
Inserting equations (2) and (3) into (6) gives:
Calculating the first derivative with respect to b shows that becoming more overconfident increases agent 1's relative performance compared to agent 2 if the bias is moderate, b <
Furthermore, it follows from (7) that Moreover, the comparative advantage of agent 1 can persist even if agent 2 is the more skilled agent (cf. equation (9)). Accordingly, overconfidence can lead to a situation where the biased agent 1 has a greater chance of winning the contest despite being the less able one. In this case, the induced increase in agent 1's effort leads to an increase in the winning probability that outweighs agent 1's higher cost; 6 Whenc 1 < c 2 < c 1 , we solve c 2 (c 2 − b) − (c 1 − b) 2 ≥ 0 for b (cf. equation (7)). The inequality is quadratic in b, and b 1 and b 2 are the two existing zeros for c 2 ≥ thus agent 1 is better off than his opponent, although he exerts the higher effort and has the higher effort cost per unit of effort.
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Finally, a comparison of agent 1's payoff for the case of b > 0 with that of the benchmark scenario, b = 0, shows that being overconfident may indeed even improve agent 1's absolute payoff as
i.e. if agent 1 is the more skilled agent (c 2 > c 1 ) and the bias is sufficiently small. To see that (10) holds, note that: 
because
is always smaller than zero as b < c 1 .
Proposition 1 below summarises the main points of the above analysis.
Proposition 1 For the above described Tullock-contest between an overconfident agent 1 with a strictly positive bias (b > 0) and a rational agent 2, it holds that:
1. The principal is strictly better off than in the case without overconfidence (b = 0) as e * 1 + e * 2 > e
2. Agent 1 overexerts effort with respect to his ability, i.e. ), agent 1's relative performance as measured by the difference in equilibrium payoffs ∆U * = U * 1 − U * 2 is increasing in b.
6. Agent 1's equilibrium payoff is larger than that of agent 2, i.e. ∆U * > 0, if
7. Agent 1 has an absolute payoff advantage from being overconfident if his true cost of effort is smaller than that of agent 2 and if his bias is small, i.e. Extension to two overconfident agents. As a last step of the analysis, we briefly consider the case of two overconfident agents with different biases but identical true effort cost c. For the sake of argument, we assume that agent 1's bias is larger than the bias of agent 2, i.e. 0 < b 2 < b 1 < c. 8 In this case, assuming as before that both agents know their own perceived costc i and the perceived cost of their opponent c −i and solving the corresponding maximisation problem described in equation (1), we obtain the following equilibrium effort levels:
Moreover, inserting equilibrium efforts into the agents' utility functions (cf. equation (5)), the expression for ∆U becomes:
And, as ∆w > 0, the condition for the more biased agent 1 to be better off, ∆Û > 0, can be simplified to
Thus, the more biased agent 1 is better off (worse off) than agent 2 whenever the sum of the biases is smaller (larger) than c. Finally, it deserves a mention that the continuity of the agents' reaction and utility functions ensures that the main results of the analysis -(a) that overconfidence may outweigh a higher cost of effort (cf. Proposition 1.6) and (b) that the 9 See Footnote 8.
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relative advantage of being more (or less) overconfident in the case with two biased agents and equal true effort cost depends on the sum of the biases (cf. Proposition 2) -also transfer to the more general case of two overconfident agents with different effort cost (at least for some range of parameters).
